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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE AT THE DAWN OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM: 
"BRISTL[ING] WITH HOSTILITY TO ALL THINGS 
RELIGIOUS"* OR NECESSARY SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE? 
Charles J. Russo** and Ralph D. Mawdsley *** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its first two cases of the new Millennium involving the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, 1 the Supreme Court continued to reveal 
the deep ideological polarization of its members on the place of 
religion in education, whether dealing with prayer at public 
school activities or aid to religiously affiliated nonpublic 
schools. In the first of the two disputes, a closely divided CourtQ 
in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (Santa Fe), 
* In his strident dissent in Santa Fe Independent School District u. Doe, 120 S. 
Ct. 2266, 2283 (2000), wherein the Court struck down student sponsored and led 
prayer prior to the start of a high school football game, Chief Justice Rehnquist railed 
that the majority opinion" ... bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life." 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
** Charles J. Russo, Professor, Department of Educational Leadership, Adjunct 
Professor, School of Law, and Fellow, Center for International Programs, University of 
Dayton. B.A. 1972, St. John's University; M. Div. 1978, Seminary of the Immaculate 
Conception; J.D. 1983, St. John's University; Ed.D. 1989, St. John's University. char-
les.russo@notes. udayton.edu. 
*** Ralph D. Mawdsley, Professor of Educational Administration, Cleveland 
State University, Cleveland, Ohio. J.D., University of Illinois; Ph.D., University of 
Minnesota. 2001 President, Education Law Association. Dr. Mawdsley has written ex-
tensively on religious liberty issues and is the author of over 260 publications, includ-
ing twelve books. At Cleveland State University, Dr. Mawdsley teaches courses in 
School Law, Sports Law, and Special Education Law. He has served as an assistant 
county prosecutor and an in-house legal counsel for a university. He is licensed to prac-
tice law in Illinois and Minnesota. 
1. In its relevant section, the First Amendment reads that, "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;" 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. 2266. 
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ruled that a school board policy permitting student led prayers 
prior to the start of high school football games violated the Es-
tablishment Clause. Nine days later, in Mitchell u. Helms 
(Helms), 3 with the majority and dissent essentially changing 
sides, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute that permits states to loan educational materials and 
equipment to public and religiously affiliated nonpublic 
schools. 
Whether the Supreme Court is, in the words of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, "hostil[e] to all things religious"4 thereby at-
tempting to deprive religion of an opportunity to participate in 
the public marketplace of ideas, or merely maintaining a nec-
essary separation of Church and State, certainly depends on 
one's perspective. Regardless of how one interprets the Court's 
most recent decisions, it is clear that the juxtaposition of judi-
cial analyses in Santa Fe and Helms are worth considering not 
only because of their impact on education but also for what 
they mean with regard to the Court's wider First Amendment 
jurisprudence. As such, the remainder of this article is divided 
into three sections. The first section sets the stage by briefly 
reviewing key Supreme Court cases on governmental aid tore-
ligiously affiliated nonpublic schools and prayer in public 
schools. The next section briefly reviews the opinions in Santa 
Fe and Helms. The final section of the article examines the 
meaning of Santa Fe and Helms for the future of the Supreme 
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. More specifically, 
this section of the article focuses on whether the Court has dis-
played hostility toward religion and what test it is likely to ap-
ply in subsequent litigation. The article closes with a reflection 
on what potential changes in the Court's membership over the 
next few years might mean for the future of First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The well documented history of the Court's Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence on both state aid to religiously affiliated 
3. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000). 
4. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. 2266. 
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nonpublic elementary and secondary schools5 and prayer6 in a 
variety of school settings follows anything but a linear progres-
sion. In other words, although the Court's first case on the mer-
its of the Establishment Clause,7 Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion,8 involved aid, because subsequent litigation also 
addressed religious activity in the schools, 9 it did not address 
another case involving aid to nonpublic schools under the Child 
10 Benefit test for twenty-one more years. Throughout what 
might be described as the development of the first generation of 
the Court's modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
Court apparently found it unnecessary to develop a measure 
5. In addition to works cited herein, for recent articles on point, see, e.g., Carl H. 
Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the Estab-
lishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETJ!!CS & PUB. POL'Y 285 (1999); Eugene Volokh, 
Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341 
(1999); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers are Unconstitutional and Why They're Not, 13 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397 (1999); Arval A. Morris, Public Educa-
tional Services in Religious Schools: An Opening Wedge for Vouchers? 122 EDUC. L. 
REP. 545 (1998). 
6. In addition to works cited herein, for recent articles on point, see, e.g., Ralph 
D. Mawdsley, Student Choice and Graduation Prayer: Division Among the Circuits, 129 
EDUC. L. REP. 553 (1998); Lisa C. Shaw, Student-Initiated Religious Speech, the Class-
room, and the First Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Should Have Granted Review 
in Settle v. Dickson County School Board, 18 PACE L. REV. 255 (1998); Daniel N. 
McPherson, Student-Initiated Religious Expression in the Public Schools: The Need for 
a Wider Opening in the School House Gate, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 393 (1997); Myron 
Schreck, Balancing the Right to Pray at Graduation and the Responsibility of Disestab-
lishment, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1869 (1995). 
7. Prior to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court ad-
dressed three cases involving non public schools but resolved them under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Establishment Clause. 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state statute prohibiting the 
teaching of foreign language to students who had not completed eighth grade); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a compulsory attendance statute 
from Oregon that have required parents of students in nonpublic schools to send them 
to public schools); Cochran v. State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (upholding a Lou-
isiana statute that provided textbooks for students regardless of whether they attended 
public or non public schools). 
8. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
9. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 
U.S. 203 (1948) (striking down a board's practice of permitting religious leaders to 
come into public schools during the class day to provide religious instruction as viola-
tive of the Establishment Clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding 
the constitutionality of a released time program that permitted children to leave school 
early to attend religious classes in religious schools on the basis that it accommodated 
the wishes of their parents); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), see discussion at note 
41 infra and accompanying text. 
10. See discussion of Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), infra at 
note 21 and accompanying text. 
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for cases in this arena. 
However, in 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzman/ 1 the Court enun-
ciated the seemingly ubiquitous tripartite test, employed in vir-
tually all subsequent cases involving religion, as a single stan-
dard of review for Establishment Clause cases. The Court 
asked: (1) whether governmental aid has a secular legislative 
purpose, (2) whether it has a principle or primary effect that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) whether that ef-
fect creates excessive government entanglement. The Court's 
long time reliance on Lemon notwithstanding, questions can be 
raised about the propriety of this tripartite test, which was 
crafted from earlier cases on prayer and Bible reading in 
school. The Court also considered the constitutionality of a 
state real property tax exemption for church-owned property, 
making the Lemon test a kind of "one-size-fits-all" measure for 
the different kinds of issues that the Establishment Clause 
presents. Yet, as the Court struggles to define an appropriate 
test under which to review interactions between religion and 
the government, whether with regard to state aid to religiously 
affiliated nonpublic schools or prayer in public school settings, 
and despite varying degrees of dissatisfaction among the Jus-
tices, the Court continues to rely on Lemon or variations on its 
well-worn theme. Insofar as the Court's Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence has been so well documented, 12 the remainder of 
this section highlights the major cases that have shaped the 
limits of the Court's thinking in K-12 educational settings 
rather than providing an encyclopedic overview in this ever-
growing area. 
A. The Supreme Court and State Aid to Religiously Affiliated 
Nonpublic Schools 
Over the past fifty-three years, the Supreme Court has 
permitted governmental aid on the basis that it helps the indi-
11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
12. Even as the Court debates its future, the Lemon test continues to generate 
grist for the academic mill. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should it be Re-
tained, Reformulated or Rejected? 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ET!IICS & PUB. Por,'y 513 (1990); 
Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Lemon Test, 72 EDUC. L. REP. 1 
(1992); MichaelS. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993); Daniel 
0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993); Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & 
Michael Bertolini, Lemon Is a Lemon: Toward a Rational Interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1997). 
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vidual children and not their schools. Beginning with Everson 
in 194 7, the Court has developed the Child Benefit test, under 
which aid, in the forms of transportation, 13 text books, 14 and 
now, in Helms, 15 instructional materials, including computers, 
is available to students who attend religiously affiliated non-
public schools. Even so, over its lifetime, the Child Benefit test 
has had a curious history. It was applied with some favor until 
1968, was essentially stagnant between 1971 and 1985, and 
was revitalized in 1993 by a slim majority of the Court. 
1. The Genesis of the Child Benefit Test 
In Everson, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state 
statute from New Jersey that reimbursed parents for the cost 
of transportation for sending their children to nonpublic 
schools. The Court reasoned that since transportation was paid 
for by the tax dollars of all parents, regardless of where their 
children attended school, and because the aid primarily bene-
fited the students, rather than the schools they attended, the 
statute was constitutional. 
As an example of how the Court's Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence failed to develop in a linear fashion in which there 
was a logical progression of issues, the next major dispute 16 to 
shape the Court's development of a test under which to evalu-
ate the propriety of any relationships between religion and 
government arose in the companion cases of School District of 
Abington Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curtlett. 11 In 
these cases the Court addressed the constitutionality of a 
Pennsylvania statute and Maryland rule adopted pursuant to 
state laws that required Bible reading and/or the recitation of 
the Lord's prayer at the beginning of the class day in public 
schools. In both cases the state was not directly involved in the 
13. See Everson, 330 U.S. 1; but see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (strik-
ing down, inter alia, the use of public school buses to take children from religious 
schools on field trips for fear of violating the Lemon test). 
14. See Allen, 392 U.S. 236; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Wolman, 
433 U.S. 229, (upholding state statutes under which textbooks for secular subjects were 
loaned to students in non public schools). 
15. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000). 
16. Of course, in the interim, the Court ruled in Illinois ex rel. McCollum u. Board 
of Education of School District No. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach u. Clauson, 343 U.S. 
306 (1952); and Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See supra note 10 and text accom-
panying note 41 for further explanation. 
17. 374 u.s. 203 (1963). 
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composition of the prayers, children participated voluntarily, 
students could be excused from taking part in the religious ac-
tivities upon the written request of their parents or guardians, 
and no single Christian religion was favored. 
Schempp introduced a new era in the relationship between 
religion and government. The Court enunciated a two-part test 
to invalidate both practices even though neither state was di-
rectly involved in the composition of the prayers, students par-
ticipated voluntarily, and no single religion was favored. In 
creating a measure under which to evaluate the constitutional-
ity of prayer, the Court maintained that "[t]he test may be 
stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect 
of the [legislative] enactment? ... [T]o withstand the strictures 
of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative 
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion."18 Perhaps in an attempt to allay concerns that it was 
anti-religious, the Court hastened to add that nothing in its ra-
tionale excluded the secular study of the Bible in public schools 
in an appropriate context such as literature or history. 19 
The so-called "purpose and effects" test took on added sig-
nificance later in the decade when the Court applied it in a 
case involving state aid to religious schools. In Board of Educa-
tion v. Allen,20 the Court upheld a New York law requiring 
school boards to loan textbooks for secular instruction to all 
students on the ground that it applied to all children regardless 
of whether they attended public or non public schools. In Allen, 
the Court relied heavily on the fact that regulations overseeing 
the program specified which books on officially approved lists 
could be used in the non~ublic schools. Until its recent deci-
sions in Agostini v. Felton 1 and Mitchell v. Helms, 22 Allen was 
not only the last case wherein the Court expanded the horizons 
of the Child Benefit test in a K-12 setting but was also gener-
ally accepted as the outer limit of permissible aid to religiously 
affiliated nonpublic schools. 
18. Id. at 222. 
19. "The holding of the Court today plainly does not foreclose teaching about the 
Holy Scriptures or about the differences between religious sects in classes in literature 
or history. Indeed, whether or not the Bible is involved, it would be impossible to teach 
meaningfully many subjects in the social sciences or the humanities without some 
mention of religion." Id. at 300. 
20. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
21. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
22. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000). 
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2. The Hibernation of the Child Benefit Test 
The next major dispute involving the Establishment Clause 
and state aid to nonpublic schools was Lemon v. Kurtzman, 23 
wherein the Court invalidated programs from Rhode Island 
and Pennsylvania. The case from Rhode Island involved a state 
statute that paid salary supplements to certified teachers in 
nonpublic schools who taught subjects that were only offered in 
public schools. Similarly, the dispute from Pennsylvania fo-
cused on a state law that reimbursed nonpublic schools for 
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials as 
long as they did not contain "any subject matter expressing re-
ligious teaching, or the morals of any sect."24 In striking down 
both programs, the Court added a third element to the "pur-
pose and effects" test. It added excessive entanglement, from 
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City, 25 to create the tri-
partite test that it has relied on in virtually all cases involving 
the Establishment Clause. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
26 Burger declared that: 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of 
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many 
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, 
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not las-
ter "an excessive government entanglement with religion."27 
Even though the first two parts of the seemingly ubiquitous 
and increasingly unworkable Lemon test were developed in the 
context of prayer cases, the Court continued to apply it widely 
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
24. Id. at 610. 
25. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). "Determining that the legislative purpose of tax ex-
emption is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end 
the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end re~dt-the effect-is not an 
excessive government entanglement with religion." 
26. For an interesting discussion of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence of 
the Burger Court, see Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. 
CHI. 1. REV. 115 (1992). 
27. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (internal citations omitted). When addressing en-
tanglement and state aid to religiously affiliated institutions, Chief Justice Burger 
noted that the Court took three additional factors into consideration: "we must exam-
ine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the 
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and 
religious authority." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. 
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in generally striking down attempts to expand the boundaries 
of permissible state aid to religious schools. For example, in 
Meek v. Pittenger, 28 a case from Pennsylvania, the Court upheld 
textbook loans while striking down provisions that would have 
permitted loans of instructional materials such as laboratory 
equipment and the on-site delivery of auxiliary services for 
students who attended religiously affiliated nonpublic 
schools. 29 Similarly, in Wolman v. Walter, 30 a dispute from 
Ohio, the Court upheld textbook loans, reimbursement for 
standardized testing, the on-site delivery of diagnostic testing, 
and off-site delivery of therapeutic aid. At the same time, the 
Court struck down provisions that would have permitted the 
loans of instructional materials and the use of public school 
buses to take children from religiously affiliated nonpublic 
schools on field trips. 31 Interestingly, in Mitchell v. Helms, dis-
cussed below, the plurality specifically struck down those por-
tions of Meek and Wolman that prohibited the loans of instruc-
tional materials. 32 
The Child Benefit test reached its nadir in the companion 
cases of School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball33 and Aguilar 
v. Felton. 34 In Ball, the Court struck down a Michigan program 
designed to provide supplementary classes in classrooms lo-
cated in and leased from nonpublic schools that were taught by 
28. 421 u.s. 349 (1975). 
29. See also, e.g., PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down New 
York state statutes that provided direct payments to nonpublic schools to maintain fa-
cilities and tuition reimbursement and income tax credits that would have allowed low 
income parents to send their children to nonpublic schools); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 
825 (1973) (striking down a New York state statute under which the state reimbursed 
parents for the cost of sending their children to nonpublic schools); Levitt v. PEARL, 
413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking down a New York state statute that reimbursed nonpub-
lic schools for state-mandated educational records where there were insufficient safe-
guards to ensure that funds were not diverted to religious usages such as testing stu-
dents on religious matters). But see PEARL v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding 
the revised New York state statute in Levitt since sufficient safeguards were set in 
place to protect against impermissible use of public funds). 
30. 433 u.s. 229 (1977). 
31. In a ruling that defied the Court's the current trend, in Mueller v. Allen, 463 
U.S. 388 (1983) the Court upheld Minnesota's state income tax deduction for tuition, 
uniforms, and books, regardless of whether children attended public or nonpublic 
schools even though more than 90% of the people who benefited from the program had 
children in religious schools. 
32. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2555 (2000) ("[t]o the extent that Meek 
and Wolman conflict with this holding, we overrule them."). 
33. 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
34. 473 u.s. 402 (1985). 
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full-time public school employees and staff from the nonpublic 
schools who were hired on a part-time basis. The Court argued 
that while the program had a secular legislative purpose, it 
was unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment 
Clause by having the primary or principal effect of advancing 
religion. 
In Aguilar, the Court prohibited the on-site delivery of re-
medial educational services for children who attended relig-
iously affiliated schools in New York City. The aid was pro-
vided under the auspices of Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, 35 a comprehensive program designed 
to offer remedial assistance for children who are economically 
disadvantaged. Even in the absence of accusations or evidence 
of any impropriety, the Court struck it down on the basis that 
it might lead to excessive entanglement between religious 
schools and the government. In a strident dissent that essen-
tially became her rationale in subsequently striking down 
Aguilar in Agostini v. Felton,36 Justice O'Connor argued that 
the Court was "throwing the baby out with the bath water" 
since the Court's unwarranted concern over fears of excessive 
entanglement would mean that so many students would be, 
and in fact were, deprived of greatly needed educational ser-
. 37 
VICeS. 
3. Revitalization of Child Benefit 
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the 
Blind, 38 although decided in the context of higher education, 
was a harbinger of future developments. In Witters, the Court 
35. 20 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. 
36. 473 U.S. 373, 421 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
37. Following Aguilar, one researcher estimated that perhaps 30% of eligible 
children in non public schools were deprived of services. Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles 
J. Russo, Supreme Court Upholds Religious Liberty: Educational Implications, 84 
EDUC. L. REP. 877, 893 (1993) at n.141 and accompanying text. Moreover, in Agostini, 
the Court noted that following Aguilar, it was estimated that some 20,000 economically 
disadvantaged students in New York City and more than 183,000 children nation-wide 
experienced a decline in Title I services. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 213 
(1997). 
38. 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (reh'g denied, Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for 
the Blind, 4 75 U.S. 1091 (1986). In fairness, it should be noted that the Supreme Court 
of Washington, in Witters v. State Commission for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 
1989), cert. denied sub nom. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 493 
U.S. 850 (1989) subsequently found that language in the state constitution prohibited 
the use of public funds for religious instruction. 
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decided that a vocational rehabilitation program that provided 
financial assistance to a blind student studying for the ministry 
at a Bible college did not violate the Establishment Clause. The 
Court reasoned that since the student could have relied on the 
program in a variety of different institutions if, for example, he 
had wished to study to be an accountant, then it was constitu-
tional since he, and not the college, was the primary benefici-
ary of the aid. 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District:~9 marked the 
beginning of the resurgence of the Child Benefit test in the K-
12 context. Here, the Court relied on the Child Benefit test and 
ruled that it permitted the on-site delivery of the services of a 
sign language interpreter for a deaf student as he attended a 
Catholic high school in Arizona. The Court found that since the 
interpreter was a mere conduit of information, the student was 
entitled to receive the services on-site because he, not his 
school, was the primary beneficiary of the aid. 
In Agostini v. Felton,40 the Supreme Court took the unusual 
step of vitiating an injunction that had been entered after its 
earlier decision in Aguilar v. Felton when it essentially re-
versed its earlier judgment by striking down an injunction that 
prohibited New York City from delivering Title I services on-
site in religious schools. Writing for the Court, Justice 
O'Connor, in basically offering her dissent in Aguilar as the 
Court's holding, reasoned that New York City's implementation 
of Title I did not violate the Establishment Clause because 
there was no governmental indoctrination, there were no dis-
tinctions between recipients based on religion, and there was 
no excessive entanglement. As such, the Court held that as a 
federally-funded program that provides supplemental, reme-
dial instruction to disadvantaged children, Title I's delivery of 
services on-site in religiously affiliated schools did not run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause because it had appropriate 
safeguards in place to prevent the endorsement of religion. 
B. The Supreme Court and Prayer in Schools 
The Court first addressed the propriety of prayer in a school 
setting when, shortly after the New York State Board of Re-
gents offered a prayer for recitation at the start of the day in 
39. 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
40. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
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public schools, parents filed suit arguing that the practice was 
contrary to their religious beliefs and those of their children. In 
Engel v. Vitale, 41 the Court considered the constitutionality of 
prayer in schools, holding that the Board violated the First 
Amendment even though students could have been excused 
from participation. The Court concluded that governmental in-
volvement in creating the prayer was dangerously close to the 
official establishment of religion. A year later, in the compan-
ion cases of School District of Abington Township v. Schempp 
and Murray v. Curlett, 42 the Court, as noted earlier, applied the 
first two parts of what became the Lemon test. In spite of this 
initial flurry of activity on prayer in schools, after Schempp, it 
was more than twenty years before the Court returned to the 
question as it focused its attention on litigation involving gov-
ernmental aid to religiously affiliated nonpublic schools. 
As state legislatures sought to circumvent the Court's ban 
on school-sponsored43 prayer and religious activity,44 laws 
mandatinE or permitting moments of silence emerged. Wallace 
v. Jaffree was the first such case to make its way to the Su-
preme Court. Here, an Alabama statute originally providing for 
a moment of silent meditation was amended to include volun-
tary prayer. The Court found it unnecessary to proceed beyond 
Lemon's first prong in deciding that the law violated the Estab-
lishment Clause because the legislature was motivated solely 
by the religious purpose of returning organized prayer to the 
41. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
42. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
43. In Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), reh'g denied 449 U.S. 1104 (1981), 
612 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1981), the Supreme Court struck down, without the benefit of oral 
argument, a statute from Kentucky that required the posting of the Ten Command-
ments on a wall of each public classroom in the Commonwealth on the ground that it 
violated the Establishment Clause. 
44. The Court has held firm against prayer in the schools but not other arenas. 
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska legislature's 
practice of hiring a religious chaplain to open each legislative day with a prayer). But 
see Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,171 F.3d 369 (6"' Cir. 1999), petition for 
rehearing en bane denied, 183 F.3d 538 (6"' Cir. 1999) (striking down a prayer initiated 
by the board president as violating the Establishment Clause). But see Bacus v. Palo 
Verde Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 11 F. Supp.2d 1192 "cc.D. Cal. 1998) (holding 
that since prayer at the start of a board meeting was not at a school related function, it 
was constitutional). For a discussion of Coles, see Charles J. Russo, Between A Rock 
and A Hard Place: The Emerging Question of Prayer at School Board Meetings, 137 
EDUC. 1. REP. 423 (1999). 
45. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
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public schools.46 In accordance with that decision, the Court 
struck the law down since it clearly intended to characterize 
prayer as a favored practice. 
In Karcher u. May, 47 the only other case involving a moment 
of silence to reach the Supreme Court, the Justices avoided 
reaching a judgment on the merits. 48 The Court ruled that the 
appellants, former leaders of the New Jersey State Assembly 
and Senate who lost their leadership positions, lacked standing 
to appeal the Third Circuit's decision upholding a ruling that 
the statute permitting a moment of silence was unconstitu-
t . l 49 wna. 
In 1991, the Court finally accepted a case on the merits of 
46. If ever there was a smoking gun, State Senator Donald G. Holmes, prime 
sponsor of the bill, provided one. He testified that the law "was an 'effort to return vol-
untary prayer to our public schools .. .it is a beginning and a step in the right direction.' 
Apart from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school, [he] unequivocally 
testified that he had 'no other purpose in mind"' when he introduced the bill. !d. at 43. 
47. 484 U.S. 72 (1987). For a discussion of this case, see StevenS. Goldberg, The 
Supreme Court Remains Silent on Moments of Silence: Karcher v. May, 43 EDUC. L. 
REP. 849 (1988). 
48. Early in the twentieth century, five courts, in six different cases, had earlier 
held that religious activities in the morning did not violate state constitutions. Dona-
hoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263 (1880); Moore v. 
Monroe, 20 N.W. 475 (Iowa 1884); Billard v. Board ofEduc. of Topeka, 76 P. 422 (Kan. 
1904); Hackett v. Brooksville Graded Sch. Dist., 87 S.W. 792 (Ky. 1905); Knowlton v. 
Baumhover, 166 N.W. 202 (Iowa 1918). However, at least five courts, including Illinois, 
which had previously decided to the contrary, held that religious exercise violated their 
constitutions. See State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890); Freeman 
v. Scheve, 91 N.W. 846 (Neb. 1902); People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ. of Dist. 24, 92 
N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910); Herold v. Parish Bd. of Sch. Directors, 68 So. 116 (La. 1915); State 
ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 226 N.W. 348 (S.D. 1929). 
49. In Bown v. Gwinnett County School District, 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997), a 
teacher in Georgia unsuccessfully challenged a state law that permits a moment of 
quiet reflection in public schools. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the law satisfied 
the Lemon test. 
More recently, the Fourth Circuit, in an unreported decision, refused to grant an 
injunction to the American Civil Liberties Union that would have blocked a Virginia 
statute, Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-203 calling for a" ... one-minute period of silence [during 
which] the teacher responsible for each classroom shall take care that all pupils remain 
silent and make no distracting display to the end that each pupil may, in the exercise 
of his or her individual choice, meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity 
which does not interfere with, distract, or impede other pupils in the like exercise of 
individual choice." Philip Walzer, et a!, Minute of Silence Debuts: Schools Start Re-
quired Quiet Interval Despite ACLU Objection, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT & THE LEDGER 
STAR, Sept. 6, 2000, 2000 WL 23683153. Using Justice Stevens obtuse reasoning in 
Santa Fe lndt. Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (see infra note 61 and accompa-
nying text), wherein the policy was struck down even before it went into effect, fears of 
religion creeping into public education may lead some jurists to strike down otherwise 
facially neutral statutes of this type. 
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graduation prayer 5° in Lee v. Weisman. 51 Based on the school 
system's policy of inviting religious leaders to pray at gradua-
tion ceremonies, administrators in Providence, Rhode Island, 
asked a rabbi to offer nonsectarian prayers which followed the 
guidelines prepared by the National Conference of Christians 
and Jews. After a student and her father unsuccessfully sought 
to prevent the rabbi from offering the prayers at her gradua-
tion, a federal trial court enjoined the district from permitting 
prayer at graduation ceremonies, holding that doing so violated 
the effect prong of Lemon by creating a symbolic union between 
religion and the government.52 The First Circuit affirmed with-
out finding it necessary to expand on the trial court's analy-
. 53 
SIS. 
The Supreme Court, in a five to four opinion written by 
Justice Kennedy, affirmed but surprised most observers by vir-
tually ignoring Lemon.54 Kennedy's opinion focused on two 
main points: the relationships between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses, and the Free Speech and Establish-
ment Clauses. Justice Scalia issued a scathing dissent wherein 
he declared that the Court went "beyond the realm where 
judges know what they are doing. The Court's argument that 
state officials have 'coerced' students to take part in the invoca-
tion and benediction ceremonies is, not to put too fine a point 
on it, incoherent."55 In the interim, the circuit courts have been 
split over the propriety of prayer at graduation ceremonies. 56 
50. For a fuller discussion of prayer at public school graduation ceremonies, see 
Charles J. Russo, Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: Exercise in Futility 
or a Teachable Moment? BYU EDUC. AND L.J. 1 (Winter 1999). 1-23. See also Ralph D. 
Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, Lee v. Weisman: The Supreme Court Pronounces the 
Benediction on Public School Graduation Prayers, 77 EDUC. L. REP. 1071 (1992). 
51. 505 u.s. 577 (1992). 
52. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990). 
53. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990). 
54. 505 U.S. at 577. 
55. !d. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
56. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. 
granted, vacated, and remanded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992); on remand, 977 F.2d 963 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (upholding student sponsored prayer at a public high school graduation 
ceremony), reh'g denied, 983 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 967 (1993). 
See also Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993), affd in 
part, rev'd in part, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted and judgment vacated with 
directions to dismiss as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995) (initially holding that since school 
officials ultimately controlled the ceremony, they could not permit students to decide 
whether to have public prayer at graduation); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l 
Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3"' Cir. 1996) (affirming that a policy of permitting student-
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However, it was not until Santa Fe, 57 discussed below, that the 
Court decided to address prayer in a narrow setting such as at 
a high school football game. 58 
led prayer at a public high school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment 
Clause, finding that since the board retained significant authority over the ceremony, 
prayer could not be upheld as promoting the free speech rights of students); Doe v. 
Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 7 F. Supp.2d 1110 (D. Idaho 1997), affd 147 F.3d 832 (9th 
Cir. 1998), reh'g granted, opinion withdrawn, 165 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated, 
177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (initially upholding a board policy permitting students, 
chosen on the basis of neutral secular criteria, to offer uncensored presentations, in-
cluding prayers, during high school graduation programs since it had a secular pur-
pose, a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and avoided exces-
sive government entanglement with religion); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 
1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a board policy permitting students to vote on 
whether to have unrestricted student-led messages at the beginning and closing of 
graduation ceremonies did not violate the Establishment Clause), opinion vacated, 
2000 WL 694156 (Oct. 2, 2000). 
57. Earlier, the Eleventh Circuit banned prayer prior to the start of public school 
football games. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied 490 U.S. 1090 (1989). See also Steele v. Van Buren Pub. Sch. Dist., 845 F.2d 
1492 (8th Cir. 1988) (prohibiting a high school band teacher from leading the band in 
prayer at mandatory rehearsals and performances); Doe v. Airline Indep. Sch. Dist., 
563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that recitation of an expressly Christian 
prayer initiated by the principal or other school employee at athletic contests and pep 
rallies violated the Establishment Clause). 
58. Lower federal courts have examined the propriety of student-initiated prayer 
at a variety of school activities other than graduations. See, e.g., lngbretsen v. Jackson 
Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. Ingebretsen, 
519 U.S. 965 (1996) (invalidating a law that allowed students to initiate nonsectarian, 
nonproselytizing prayer at various compulsory and noncompulsory school events); Doe 
v. Duncanville lndep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1993) (prohibiting school em-
ployees from initiating and leading students in prayer before and after athletic prac-
tices and competitions); Chandler v. James, 958 F. Supp. 1550 (M.D. Ala 1997), affd in 
part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 180 F.3d 1254 (11'" Cir. 1999), request for en bane 
rehearing denied, 198 F.3d 265 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a school district's act of 
allowing student initiated, nonsectarian, nonproselytizing voluntary prayer as school-
related events did not violate the Establishment Clause since it was required under the 
Free Speech and Expression Clause of the First Amendment); Herdahl v. Pontotoc 
County Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (prohibiting a religious club from 
making announcements, including prayers and Bible readings, over a school wide in-
tercom system; however, the court did permit student-initiated prayer before school to 
continue); Committee for Voluntary Prayer v. Wimberly, 704 A.2d 1199 (D.C. 1997) 
(holding that a proposed initiative on nonsectarian, nonproselytizing, student initiated 
prayer at school related activities was not a proper subject within the meaning of voter 
initiated measures). 
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III. THE CASES 
A. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 
The Board of Trustees of the Santa Fe Independent School 
District, near Galveston, Texas, following Lee v. Weisman 59 and 
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,60 adopted 
policies permitting student volunteers to deliver prayers at 
graduations and football games. In April 1995, students and 
their parents challenged the prayer policies seeking injunctive 
relief and money damages under the theory that the policies 
violated the Establishment Clause. 
A federal trial court upheld both policies as long as the 
prayers were nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. Moreover, 
since the Board had fall-back policies in place, adopted in the 
event that they were struck down, requiring the prayers to be 
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing, the court refused to grant 
prospective injunctive relief, damages, or attorney fees. 61 Both 
parties appealed, the plaintiffs because the policies had not 
been found to violate the Establishment Clause and the defen-
dants since the Board had to use its fall-back policies. The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed that prayer at graduation had to be nonsectar-
ian and nonproselytizing, reversed and struck down the policy 
permitting prayers at football games, affirmed the denial of in-
junctive relief and damages, and reversed the denial of attar-
' (}2 ney s fees. 
1. Supreme Court Majority Decision 
Rather than review the broader question of prayer at 
graduation ceremonies and resolve the split between the Cir-
cuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited 
question of "[w]hether [the school district's] policy permitting 
student-led, student-initiated.prayer at football Jiames violates 
the Establishment Clause."6 As anticipated, a fractured 
59. 505 U.S. at 577. 
60. On remand following Lee, the Fifth Circuit, in Jones v. Clear Creek Independ· 
cnt School District, 977 F.2d at 963, essentially followed Justice Scalia's dissent in Lee 
and upheld student-initiated graduation prayer. 
61. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
62. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5'" Cir. 1999), rehearing en 
bane denied, 171 F.3d 1013 (5'" Cir. 1999). 
63. 528 U.S. 1002 (1999). 
246 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2001 
Court, in a six to three vote, affirmed that the policy was un-
constitutional.65 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found that just as 
in Lee, prayer at a school-sponsored event, whether a football 
game or a graduation ceremony, violated the Establishment 
Clause. 66 However, in Santa Fe, Stevens relied on the endorse-
ment test rather than Kennedy's psychological coercion test. 
Put another way, Stevens reviewed the status of prayer from 
the perspective of whether its being permitted at football 
games was an impermissible governmental approval or en-
dorsement rather than as a form of psychological coercion 
which subjected fans to values and/or beliefs other than their 
own. In vitiating the prayer golicy, Stevens rejected the dis-
trict's three main arguments. First, Justice Stevens disagreed 
with the district's position that the policy furthered the free 
speech rights of students.68 He argued that the policy did not 
create a limited public forum as, for example, in Rosenberger u. 
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 69 where the uni-
versity had to pay for a student publication with a religious 
perspective, because the district policy in Santa Fe limited 
speech to one single student for an entire season. At the same 
time, Stevens was unconvinced that the prayer was student, 
rather than government, speech since the district chose the 
process by which a student would be selected, the purpose of 
the message, and when the message would be delivered, 
namely at a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored function, on 
school property using a public address system that was under 
the control of school officials. Consequently, Stevens was of the 
opinion that a majoritarian process cannot be used to shut out 
the views of a minority insofar as the selection process assured 
64. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's ruling and possible outcomes, see Ralph 
D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, Student Prayers at Public School Sporting Events: 
Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 143 EDUC. L. REP. 415 (2000). 
65. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000) Justice Stevens's 
majority opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and 
Breyer. 
66. See id. at 2274. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. at 2287. 
69. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that the University's policy of funding the publi-
cations of student organizations could not be used to deny funding for a publication 
with a religious perspective as this was viewpoint discrimination which violated the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment). 
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that minority candidates would never have the opportunity to 
deliver a message and that their views would be effectively si-
lenced. 
Stevens rejected the district's second argument, facial neu-
trality, despite its claim that it had secular goals and purposes: 
to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and 
student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment 
for the competition. Stevens responded that in relying on the 
perceptions of an objective student, the alleged secular goals 
were a sham since based on the district's history of permitting 
prayer at events it was, in effect, board-sponsored prayer. 70 He 
also rejected the district's use of two separate student elections 
as a sham and its claims that prayer at football games was less 
coercive than at graduations because even if most students 
could chose to skip the pregame prayer, a number of partici-
pants, such as band members, cheerleaders, and players had to 
be there, indicating that prayer had the improper effect of co-
ercing those present to participate in an act of religious wor-
ship. Stevens posited that the policy, which encouraged the se-
lection of a religious message and furthered only one specific 
kind of message, an invocation, did not further a secular pur-
pose. 
Turning to the district's attempted third defense, Stevens 
almost dismissed out of hand its position that claims for relief 
were premature since there was no certainty that any of the 
statements or invocations would be religious until a student ac-
tually delivered a solemnizing message. He decided that the 
policy's unconstitutional purpose was reflected by the board's 
involvement in the election of the speaker and content of the 
message coupled with language in the policy identifying what 
he viewed as the clearly preferred message of a traditional reli-
gious invocation. This led Stevens to conclude that even if no 
student in the school system ever offered a religious message, 
the policy was unconstitutional because of the district's at-
71 tempt to encourage prayer. 
2. Supreme Court Dissent 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent began by declaring that 
Justice Stevens's opinion "bristles with hostility to all things 
70. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2278. 
71. Id. at 2279. 
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religious in public life."72 What Rehnquist apparently consid-
ered most disturbing was, in light of the fact that the policy 
was never implemented, Stevens's refusal to defer to the dis-
trict's purposes as other than religious and dismissing them as 
a sham. 
Rehnquist viewed the issue in Santa Fe as student, not 
government, speech where, unlike Lee's having a prayer deliv-
ered by a rabbi under the direction of a school official, the pol-
icy allowed prayer to be selected or created by a pupil. As 
Rehnquist asserted, if the student had been selected on wholly 
secular criteria, such as public speaking skills or social popu-
larity, he or she could have delivered a religious message that 
would likely have passed constitutional muster. 73 
B. Mitchell v. Helms 
Mitchell v. Helms, 14 a case with a lengthy procedural his-
tory,75 originally involved three issues, only the third of which 
reached the Supreme Court. In the parts of the case that were 
not accepted on a}i?peal, the Fifth Circuit held that following 
Agostini v. Felton, wherein the Court upheld the on-site deliv-
ery of federally funded remedial programs in religious schools 
for poor students in New York City, a Louisiana statute allow-
ing the on-site delivery of special education services in religious 
schools was constitutional. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed that 
a nonprofit corporation that paid for transporting children to 
and from their religious schools was constitutional. The most 
contentious part of the case at issue before t!)e Supreme Court 
involved the Fifth Circuit's striking down of Chapter 2 of Title 
I, now Title VI, of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
72. Id. at 2283 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent 
was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
73. Id. at 2287. 
74. Helms v. Cody, 856 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. La. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in 
part sub nom. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998), opinion amended and 
reh'g denied by Helms v. Picard, 165 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. 
Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999). 
75. The programs in Helms addressed the use of public funds in religious schools 
beginning in the early 1980s. For a background story on the litigation, see Mark Walsh, 
A Parish Offering, Eouc. WEEK, Nov. 10, 1999, 37-40. The originally named plaintiff, 
Mary Helms, had a daughter in the Jefferson Parish School District; the named defen-
dant/respondent has changed with each new State Superintendent of Education. 
76. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
231] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 249 
Act, 77 a comprehensive federal statute that permits the loans of 
instructional materials such as library books, computers, tele-
vision sets, tape recorders, and maps to nonpublic schools. 
1. Supreme Court Majority Opinion 
In a six to three vote, a splintered Court, as expected, 78 in a 
plurality opinion authored by Justice Thomas,79 reversed the 
judgment of the Fifth Circuit and upheld the constitutionality 
of Chapter 2. Although not explicitly naming it, Thomas ex-
panded the parameters of the Child Benefit test, under which 
governmental aid, in the forms of books, transportation, and 
now, instructional materials, including computers, is available 
to students who attend religious schools. Thomas acknowl-
edged that Agostini modified the seemingly ubiquitous tripar-
tite Lemon 80 test, used in more than thirty cases in this area, 
(which asks whether governmental aid has a secular legislative 
purpose, has a principle or primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion, and does not create excessive en-
tanglement) by reviewing only its first two parts while recast-
ing entanglement as one criterion in determining a statute's 
effect. Further, since the purpose part of the test was not chal-
lenged, Thomas found it necessary only to consider the effects 
of Chapter 2. 
As a threshold concern, Justice Thomas decided that Chap-
ter 2 did not foster impermissible religious indoctrination since 
the aid was allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria 
that neither favored nor disfavored religion and was available 
to all schools on a nondiscriminatory basis. Thomas next re-
jected two rules that the dissent would have relied on govern-
ing Chapter 2-type aid-that direct, nonincidental assistance 
was impermissible and that aid to religious schools was uncon-
stitutional if it could be diverted to sectarian purposes-as in-
consistent with the Court's recent holdings. In the process, Jus-
tice Thomas reversed those parts of Meek u. Pittenger and 
77. 20 u.s. c.§§ 7301-73. 
78. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's ruling and possible outcomes, see Char-
les J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, Giving with One Hand and Taking with the Other: 
State Aid to Religiously Affiliated NonPublic Schools,140 EDUC. L. REP. 807 (2000). 
79. Justice Thomas's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Kennedy. 
80. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (internal citations omitted). 
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Wolman u. Walter that struck down programs that delivered 
many of the same types of aid as Chapter 2. 
After rebuffing Justice Souter's fears that aid would lead to 
political divisiveness, Thomas applied two principles from 
Agostini in holding that Chapter 2 did not have the effect of 
advancing religion. First, he noted that Chapter 2 recipients 
are not defined by reference to religion in reiterating that the 
aid is available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all schools on 
the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor dis-
favor religion. Second, he maintained that Chapter 2 did not 
foster governmental indoctrination of religion since eligibility 
was not only determined on a neutral basis, using a broad ar-
ray of criteria, without regard to whether a school was reli-
gious, but also because parents made private choices in select-
ing where their children would be educated. Thomas thus held 
that Chapter 2 did not have the effect of advancing religion 
even though the aid could be described as "direct" since it was 
"nonideological"81 and there was no evidence that any of the 
equipment was diverted to religious purposes. 82 
2. Supreme Court Concurrence 
In her lengthy concurrence, Justice O'Conno/3 agreed with 
the result but was concerned that Justice Thomas went too far, 
since his position might uphold any form of aid to students in 
religious schools that is secular and offered on a neutral basis. 
More specifically, while acknowledging that neutrality is an 
important reason for upholding government-aid programs in 
the face of Establishment Clause challenges, she added that, 
"we have never held that a government-aid program passes 
constitutional muster solely because of the neutral criteria it 
employs as a basis for distributing aid."84 Moreover, in agreeing 
with the dissent to the extent that the Court never upheld an 
evenhanded approach to aid as the sole basis for satisfying the 
81. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2553 (2000) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §7372). 
82. For a recent case involving issues similar to Helms, see Freedom from Relig-
ion Found. v. Bugher, 55 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (upholding a state subsidy of 
an Internet link to assist schools, some of which were religiously affiliated, but striking 
down direct cash grants to the religious schools as there were no restrictions on the use 
of the funds). 
83. To the surprise of many, Justice O'Connor's concurrence was joined by Justice 
Breyer, ordinarily a separationist. 
84. Helms, 120 S. Ct. at 2557. 
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Establishment Clause, Justice O'Connor refused to discount 
the importance of determining whether aid directly aids reli-
gious schools. To this end, she found it necessary to distinguish 
programs where the aid is based on private choice from those 
with a per-capita basis such as Chapter 2 programs. In adopt-
ing this line of analysis, Justice O'Connor found cases such as 
Witters and Zobrest acceptable because aid based on the private 
choice of students or parents makes them look less like a direct 
subsidy. On the other hand, she was concerned that per-capita 
aid programs create a public perception that, if the religious 
school uses the aid to inculcate religion, the government has 
sent a message of endorsement. Yet, she offered that, if private-
choice and per-capita programs are treated the same, there is 
no reason to preclude the government from providing direct 
money payments to religious organizations, including churches, 
based on the number of persons who belong to each organiza-
tion. 
In sum, while she was concerned with Justice Thomas's ap-
proval of diversion of government aid for religious indoctrina-
tion, she was satisfied that the Chapter 2 aid, which supple-
mented rather than supplanted federal aid, neither resulted in 
government indoctrination nor defined recipients by reference 
to religion. Further, Justice O'Connor was content not only that 
there were sufficient monitoring procedures in place to avoid 
the risk of diverting government funds to religious purposes, 
but also that over four years of discovery covering fifteen years 
of aid to religious schools revealed only "de minimis" instances 
of"actual diversion."85 
3. Supreme Court Dissent 
Justice Souter's lengthy and strident dissent voiced his fear 
that Justice Thomas's opinion was a radical departure from the 
Court's precedent that risked "compelling an individual to sup-
port religion [which] violates the fundamental principle of free-
dom of conscience."86 He was also concerned that Thomas's 
opinion violated the prohibition against governmental estab-
lishment of religion by providing substantial aid to religious 
schools, and "government establishment of religion is inextri-
85. Id. at 2562. 
86. /d. at 2574. As anticipated, Justice Souter's dissent was joined by Justices 
Stevens and Ginsburg. Helms, 120 S. Ct. at 2572 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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cably linked with conflict."87 
IV. REFLECTIONS 
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe and Mitchell v. 
Helms, although clearly addressing different issues in the wide 
range of Church-State relations, evidenced not only the on-
going deep divide within the Court but also a kind of internal 
consistency among the Justices as the majority and dissent es-
sentially changed sides in Santa Fe and Helms. In viewing 
Helms and Santa Fe together, it is fascinating to observe the 
split among the Supreme Court Justices, especially as the po-
tential near-term vacancies based on the age and or health 
concerns of several Justices may lead to very different results 
in this closely-contested arena. At present, the Justices fit into 
three fairly consistent categories. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
along with Justices Scalia and Thomas88 are accommodation-
ists who would permit state aid to students in religious schools 
and prayer in public schools. At the other end of the bench, 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer89 are separa-
tionists.90 The two moderates, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, 
typically tip the Court's balance by joining either the accom-
modationists or the separationists. 
Of the two cases, Helms appears to be more far-reaching 
than Santa Fe for two reasons. First, Helms is likely to have a 
greater impact than Santa Fe because estimates are that more 
than one million children in the United States benefit from 
87. !d. at 2575. 
88. During Justice Thomas's first five years on the High Court, he and Justice 
Scalia voted together 80% of the time. At the same time, Justice Breyer voted with Jus-
tice Souter 84% of the time, while Justice Ginsberg voted with Justice Souter 80% of 
the time. Daniel E. Troy, The Court's Mr. Right, NATIONAL REV., Aug. 9, 1999 at 39-41. 
89. Perhaps the biggest surprise in Helms was that Justice Breyer joined Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence. 
90. For a discussion of the attitudes of the ,Justices with regard to their ideologi-
cal stances, see Charles J. Russo & Allan G. Osborne, Agostini v. Felton: Is the Demise 
of the Ghoul at Hand? 116 EDUC. L. R~;p_ 515 (1997). Predicting the results in a Su-
preme Court case can be risky business because the Justices do not always follow 
through on their word. See e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), wherein even 
though a majority of Justices had voiced their displeasure with the Lemon test, Justice 
Kennedy's opinion struck down prayer at public school graduation ceremonies on the 
basis that it was psychologically coercive, thus allowing Lemon to survive. For a dis-
cussion of the perspectives of the Justices prior to Lee, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & 
Charles J. Russo, High School Prayers at Graduation: Will the Supreme Court Pro-
nounce the Benediction~ 69 EDUC. L. REP. 189 (1991). 
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Chapter 2. Further, combining Justice Thomas's discussion of 
the importance of the private choices of parents with the 
Court's having issued a stay of a preliminary injunction 
granted by a federal trial court judge concerning the voucher 
program in Cleveland, Ohio,91 an argument can be made that 
Helms might pave the way for a favorable ruling on vouchers 
and additional forms of aid to religious schools. Although such 
a result is certainly speculative at this time in light of Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence, Justice Thomas's plurality opinion 
added fuel to the fire because he relied on the principles of neu-
trality and the private choices of parents in deciding where to 
send their children to school, buzz words that are often used by 
supporters ofvouchers. 
The second reason why Helms appears to be of greater sig-
nificance is that Santa Fe essentially follows a virtually unbro-
ken line of almost forty years of Supreme Court cases prohibit-
ing prayer in public schools that began with Engel v. Vitale. 92 
Conversely, Helms continues to clarify the Court's First 
Amendment jurisprudence by expanding the boundaries of 
permissible state aid to religious schools. 
In light of the potential impact of Santa Fe and Helms, the 
91. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999) (generally upholding 
the constitutionality of a school voucher program against an Establishment Clause 
challenge since the offending provision, which gave priority to students whose parents 
belonged to a religious group that supported a sectarian school was severable from the 
rest of the statute). But see Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp.2d 725 (N.D. Ohio 
1999) (enjoining the same statute on the basis that since the majority of schools that 
received aid were religiously affiliated, the moving party demonstrated the likelihood 
of prevailing on the merits), stay granted in part, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 1999 WL 
669222 (N.D. Ohio Aug 27, 1999), stay granted, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 120 S. Ct. 
443 (1999) (pending final disposition by the Sixth Circuit); Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 
72 F. Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that the statute, by which the state paid a 
portion of participating students tuition at non public schools or public schools adjacent 
to a city school district violated the Establishment Clause). See also, Bagley v. Ray-
mond Sch. Dept., 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 364 (1999) (affirming 
that a state tuition statute that excluded religious schools from receiving state funds 
did not violate the Establishment Clause); Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1'' Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999) (affirming that a state statute that authorized 
direct grants to nonsectarian high schools as reimbursement for the cost of educating 
students who did not have a public school available did not violate the Establishment 
Clause); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), motion for reconsideration 
withdrawn, 588 N.W.2d 635 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998) (holding that 
a parental choice program that afforded parents the opportunities to select the schools 
that their children attended, and which included religiously affiliated non public schools 
violated neither the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment nor the state con-
stitution's religious establishment provisions). 
92. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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next two sections of this article reflect on whether there is any 
legitimate basis for the Chief Justice's concerns and the inter-
play between the opinions of Justices Thomas and O'Connor on 
whether the Court may, in fact, be moving toward fashioning a 
new standard out of the increasingly weak Lemon test. The ar-
ticle wraps up with a brief consideration of the future make-up 
of the High Court bench. 
A. Hostility to Religion 
An interesting dynamic emerged in the interplay between 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Santa Fe, joined by Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Thomas's plurality opinion in Helms, 
which, in turn, was joined by the Chief Justice. Rehnquist's as-
sertions that Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Santa Fe 
"bristles with hostility to all thin~s religious in public life"H3 
and that it was "openly hostile" 4 are not entirely without 
merit, given Stevens's almost summary rejection of the board's 
stated purpose regarding the pregame invocation/message, "to 
solemnize the event [football game],"95 as a "sham."96 If a stated 
purpose "to solemnize [an] event" by having an invocation or 
benediction at a graduation is unacceptable under the Estab-
lishment Clause, it should not be too surprising that the same 
result would apply to a similar pronouncement before a football 
game. In defense of Stevens's position, the question becomes 
whether the Court was hostile to religion in refusing to permit 
the school district to allow student-initiated and led graduation 
invocations/benedictions where no secular counterpart to the 
prayers was present or whether it was merely maintaining a 
necessary separation of Church and State. 
The Chief Justice's concerns aside, it is not clear that sepa-
rationists have evidenced the hostility to religion that he 
feared. Yet, since separationists have neither been receptive to 
prayer in public schools nor aid to students in religiously affili-
ated nonpublic schools, an interesting question can be raised. 
In light of the second prong of Lemon, which prohibits the gov-
ernment from advancing or inhibiting religion, one can only 
wonder why Rehnquist has not raised this question sooner 
93. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2283 (2000). 
94. !d. at 2286. 
95. Id. at 2273. 
96. ld. at 2278. 
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since, in many cases, an argument can be made that some 
strict separationists, if not harboring outright hostility to relig-
ion, have handed down rulings that have had a chilling effect 
on religion.!J? Perhaps Rehnquist has only now reached his 
breaking point. 
Justice Thomas's opinion in Helms also highlighted a latent 
hostility to religion, or at least Roman Catholicism, in his brief 
discussion of the Blaine Amendment. 98 The Blaine Amendment 
of 1875 would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to 
sectarian institutions, using the term "religious sect," an open 
code word for Catholic, at a time of wide-spread hostility to the 
Catholic Church and Catholics. 99 In fact, it was not until almost 
a century later, in Hunt u. McNair, 100 a case involving federal 
aid in higher education, that the Court eliminated this confu-
sion by coining the term "pervasively sectarian" in referring to 
all religious schools. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Thomas's concerns 
97. See, e.g., Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 104 7 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 505 
U.S. 1218 (1992) (preventing a teacher from reading the Bible during class time and 
removing The Bible in Pictures and The Story of Jesus from his classroom library while 
books on Greek gods and goddesses and American Indian religions remain on the 
shelves); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied 514 U.S. 1095 (1995) (upholding the removal of a portrait of Christ, painted by a 
graduate of the school, that had been posed on the wall of a public high school for thirty 
years); and C. H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that a board of edu-
cation did not violate the First Amendment rights of a first grade student when school 
officials changed the location of his poster of Jesus and prevented him from reading 
Bible stories to his classmates). 
98. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2551 (2000). 
99. The Blaine Amendment, introduced by Representative James G. Blaine of 
Maine, which passed the House by an overwhelming majority of 180 in favor to 7 op-
posed, failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate, as 28 Senators fa-
vored it while 16 were opposed to it, read: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State, for the 
support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public 
lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor 
shall any money so raised, or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects 
or denominations. 
Available on line at <http:www.baylor.edu/-Church-State/Blaine_Amendment.htmb. 
For additional background, see Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Blaine Amendment of 
1875: Private Motives for Political Action, 42 CATIIOLlC HISTORICAL REV. 15 (1956). 
100. 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding a South Carolina statute that provided aid to 
colleges and universities, including ones that were religiously affiliated, by permitting 
them to issue revenue bonds for projects, excluding facilities for sectarian study or reli-
gious worship, where the institutions conveyed the projects to the state authority 
which would lease them back and reconvey them on payment of the bonds with limita-
tions being placed on their use before and after reconveyance). 
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notwithstanding, the Court has never clearly endorsed hostility 
to religion. For example, in Board of Education of Westside 
Community Schools v. Mergens, 101 Justice O'Connor applied the 
effects prong of Lemon in interpreting the Equal Access Ace02 
as meaning that the statute's "message is one of neutrality 
rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let religious 
groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate 
not neutrality but hostility toward religion."103 The notion that 
the Establishment Clause requires neutrality when govern-
ment deals with religion has gained acceptance with the pre-
104 
sent Supreme Court under both the Free Speech and Free 
Exercise105 Clauses. 
The concept of neutrality can take on different shades of 
meaning depending on the applicable criteria. In only one case, 
Corporation of The Presiding Bisho~ of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 06 has the Supreme Court 
101. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). For a discussion of Mergens, see Charles J. Russo & 
David L. Gregory, The Return of School Prayer: Reflections on the Libertar-
ian-Conservative Dilemma, 20 J. L. AND EDUC. 164 (1991). For an update on the status 
of the Equal Access Act, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Noncurriculum Related Student 
Groups Under the Equal Access Act, 137 EDUC. L. REP. 865 (1999). 
102. The Equal Access Act, in the relevant section, provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives 
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to 
deny access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any 
students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open 
forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other 
content of the speech at such meetings. 
20 U.S. C. § 4071(a). 
103. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248. 
104. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846 
(1995) ("requir(ing] public officials to scan and interpret student publications to discern 
their underlying philosophic assumptions respecting religious theory and be-
lief ... [would be] a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a perva-
sive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Estab-
lishment Clause requires."). 
105. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeh, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (in 
striking down four city ordinances that had the sole effect of prohibiting animal sacri-
fice by Santaria, a syncretistic religion, the Court declared that, "[o]fficial action that 
targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compli-
ance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects 
against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt.") 
106. 483 U.S. 327, 337-38 (1987) (upholding a statutory amendment for religious 
organizations from the prohibition against discrimination in employment under Title 
VII on the basis of religion): 
A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to 
advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have for-
bidden "effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the gov-
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upheld, against an Establishment Clause challenge, a govern-
mental accommodation of religion that did not also benefit 
secular entities. However, in Amos, an expanded exemption for 
religious organizations under Title VII served to eliminate ju-
dicial need to determine whether the activities of employees 
were related to their employer's religious mission. In any event, 
in Amos the Court did not claim that Congressional refusal to 
expand the Title VII exemption would have evidenced hostility 
towards religion. 
The question has thus become whether a court is hostile to 
religion if it looks beyond the expressed purposes for govern-
ment action and searches past practices for the real intent of 
officials. Put another way, one can wonder whether Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dissent in Santa Fe is correct; that the major-
ity demonstrated hostility toward religion by refusing to accept 
facially the school officials' stated purpose for the pregame in-
vocation/message. An alternative way of addressing this ques-
tion considers whether the search for intent by looking at past 
practice runs the risk of looking to, and/or impugning, the mo-
tives of school officials who are responsible for creating and en-
forcing school policies. The Supreme Court has frequently ex-
pressed concern that the constitutionality of government action 
should not depend entirely on the motives of public officials. 107 
For example, in Mergens, regarding the passage of the Equal 
Access Act, the Court observed: 
Even if some legislators were motivated by a conviction that 
religious speech in particular was valuable and worthy of pro-
tection, that alone would not invalidate the Act, because what 
is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the 
possible religious motives of the legislators who enacted the 
law.los 
Yet, the Court went on to note that "the Act on its face 
1 b h 1 d 10 0 h ,109 grants equa access to ot secu ar an re 1gwus speec , a 
ernment itself has advanced religion through its own activities and 
influence ... Where, as here, government acts with the proper pur-
pose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we 
see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with 
benefits to secular entities. 
107. For one noticeable exception where a legislator's motives came into play, see 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
108. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249. 
109. Id. 
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comparison that is difficult to make with a graduation "invoca-
tion/ benediction" policy that allows only for prayer.uo 
In the end, one can question whether past practice or intent 
of school officials is relevant in Santa Fe in terms of whether 
the Court is hostile toward religion. Perhaps equally significant 
is to consider whether the process that the district official 
sought to use to permit students to determine, by means of two 
separate secret votes, whether to have an invoca-
tion/benediction was only window dressing, a subterfuge to 
mask its own goal. One must consider whether the process by 
which a decision is reached, whether by school officials in Lee 
or by students in Santa Fe, matters if the end result is the 
same, namely the use of prayer. If a policy that permits either 
an invocation or message before a football game violates the 
Establishment Clause where, at least theoretically, a nonreli-
gious message is possible, then a policy permitting only an in-
vocation and/or benediction would seem to be even more in 
jeopardy. 
It is important to consider whether refusal to permit stu-
dents to elect to have a prayer at graduation represents hostil-
ity toward religion. Justice Stevens's perspective regarding 
prayer at football games seems to suggest that graduation 
prayers would be unconstitutional if they were based on a past 
practice of prayer. For school districts with such a past prac-
tice, Santa Fe offers no constitutional hope. When students are 
not even provided with the opportunity to cast a secret ballot, 
which, in effect, determines whether they wish to continue a 
past practice, one wonders whether such a decision, on its face, 
evidences opposition to religion. The question becomes how one 
defines neutrality if one eradicates a secret ballot process sim-
ply because it allows for the possibility of a religious message. 
At the same time, it is unclear which may be more threatening 
to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause, the intent of 
school officials, community members, and a majority of stu-
dents to make a minimal religious statement, or the intent of a 
majority of the Supreme Court to eliminate an event simply be-
cause it might be religious. While it is true that constitutional 
rights are not, and should not be subject to a majority vote, the 
Court needs to address the clear tension that has arisen as ac-
tivist judges at all levels seek to interpret the Constitution 
110. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
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based on their own judicial philosophies almost without regard 
for the will of the people. 
If Santa Fe represents hostility, despite the desire of school 
officials and voters in a school district to have invocations or 
benedictions at graduation, then, perhaps, the result repre-
sents the hostility of equality. An impressive uphill battle in 
the Supreme Court over the past decade has assured that reli-
gious individuals and/or organizations will have access, equal 
to claimants with secular reasons, to public school facilities 111 
and resources. 112 :However, the reliance on equality to reach 
this point seems to have its price. To permit prayers at gradua-
tion where no secular counterpart is available seems, arguably, 
to be changing the rules.m Having been forced onto a playing 
field where neutrality is defined by the presence of a secular 
counterpart, school districts will continue to find use of gradua-
tion invocations/benedictions difficult to defend. In sum, even if 
the separationists lack overt hostility to religion, given the role 
that it has played, and continues to occupy, in shaping Ameri-
can life, perhaps the Court needs to move beyond mere neutral-
ity and find a way to afford religion a greater voice in the mar-
ketplace of ideas. The role of neutrality also continues to play a 
central role in cases where state aid, rather than prayer, is at 
issue as the Court struggles to define an appropriate measure 
for evaluating the constitutionality of programs which provide 
111. See, e.g., Mergens, 496 U.S. at 226; Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (upholding, essentially as an extension of Mergens, 
a religious group's right to show a film on family values and child-rearing on the basis 
that the school district's refusal to grant them access to facilities was impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination against religion). The Supreme Court recently agreed to hear 
an appeal in a similar case wherein the Second Circuit upheld a ban against permitting 
a nondenominational children's club to engage in religious instruction and prayer in a 
public school. The Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), 
cert. granted, 2000 WL 838152 (Oct 10, 2000). 
112. To Rosenberger u. Rector of" the University of" Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 846 
(1995) can be added a genre of Supreme Court cases upholding access to government 
aid on the premises of religious schools against an Establishment Clause challenge, but 
where that aid was the same as that available to students in public schools. See Zobrest 
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997); and, Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000). 
113. Arguably, a school district's selecting students based on academic perform-
ance to speak at graduation with the possibility that some, or all, might incorporate 
religious messages would not run afoul of the Establishment Clause as long as stu-
dents are free to select their own content. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 7 F. 
Supp.2d 1110 (D. Idaho 1997), affd 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted, opinion 
withdrawn, 165 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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public funds that assist students who attend religiously-
affiliated nonpublic schools. 
B. Establishment Clause Test 
Prior to Santa Fe and Helms, the Court has relied on essen-
tially three tests when interpreting the Establishment Clause, 
most commonly the Lemon test. Although not supported by all 
114 
current members of the Court, the Lemon test has demon-
strated a remarkable resiliency, often coming back from the 
edge of oblivion. 115 Even though Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test, suggested as a standard to replace Lemon 1H> in dis-
putes where state aid was not at issue and enunciated in her 
concurrence in L;mch v. Donnelly, 117 has been applied with 
some frequency, 11 prior to Santa Fe it had not been followed by 
the majority opinion in any education case. 119 The most recent 
114. Over the years, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have voiced 
concerns over the Lemon test. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring, joined by Thomas, J.); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined 
by, Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 107-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
115. In one of his more colorful metaphors, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opin-
ion in Lambs Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398, mused that, "[!]ike some ghoul in a late-night 
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being re-
peatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once 
again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union 
Free School District." 
116. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 68 (in concurring with invalidation of Alabama stat-
ute permitting prayer along with moment of silence at beginning of school day, Justice 
O'Connor observed that, "[d]espite its initial promise, the Lemon test has proved prob-
lematic."). 
117. 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upheld the display of a 
creche among secular symbols). 
118. Even though Justice O'Connor's endorsement test in Lynch was formulated in 
a nonschool setting, the Court applied it in the next four cases involving the Estab-
lishment Clause in disputes surrounding K-12 education. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578 (1982) (striking down a state law requiring balanced treatment of crea-
tion science and evolution as violating the Establishment Clause); School Dist. v. Ball, 
473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Jaff"ree, 472 U.S. 38. Sur-
prisingly, the test was ignored in subsequent cases not involving K-12 education. See, 
e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding the Adolescent Family Life Act 
even though it aided public and non public organizations that provided services related 
to the care of pregnant adolescents and the prevention of sexual relationships in this 
age group); Amos, 483 U.S. 327; Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for Blind, 474 
U.S. 481 (1986). 
119. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (where, in addition to upholding a reli-
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test, psychological coercion, created by Justice Kennedy, has 
only appeared as controlling in Lee v. Weisman. 120 
Justice Stevens's exgress language 121 and reliance on Su-
preme Court precedene 2 in Santa Fe initially suggested that 
the two-part endorsement test is increasingly being relied on 
rather than Lemon. While Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct 
that Justice Stevens, in assessing the facial constitutionality of 
the pregame policy, did refer to "the three factors first articu-
lated in Lemon u. Kurtzman,"123 the latter actually considered 
only the secular purpose prong in concluding that the policy 
gious group's right of access to public school facilities, the Court, in refuting the dis-
trict's Establishment Clause defense using endorsement language also inexplicably 
cited to Lemon: "there would have been no realistic danger that the community would 
think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed ... "). For a 
noneducation case where the endorsement test represented the majority view, see Alle-
gheny, 492 U.S. at 573 (holding, inter alia, that the erection of a creche on steps inside 
of a courthouse violated the Establishment Clause as it resulted in the endorsement of 
Christianity). 
120. 505 U.S. 577. However, four justices in Lee also held that the use of a gradua-
tion prayer violated the endorsement test. !d. at 577. 
[TJhe Establishment Clause is infringed when the government 
makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the 
political community. Direct government action endorsing religion or 
a particular religious practice is invalid under this approach be-
cause it sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, 
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of 
the political community. 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting from Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, concurring 
in judgment)). 
See also 505 U.S. at 618 (Souter, concurring) ("Over the years, this Court has declared 
the invalidity of many non coercive state laws and practices conveying a message of re-
ligious endorsement."). 
121. The majority's conclusion that the district's policy "has the purpose and cre-
ates the perception of encouraging delivery of prayer at a series of important school 
events," Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2283 (2000), seems to be the 
logical result of such language in the decision as "[t]he actual or perceived endorsement 
of the message," and "our objective student's perception that the prayer is, in actuality, 
encouraged by the school." !d. at 2278. 
122. .Justice Stevens's majority opinion, in seeking authority for interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause looked to three of Justice O'Connor's concurrences which re-
lied on the endorsement test. !d. at 2278. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. 
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding the right of the 
Ku Klux Klan to erect an unattended cross on grounds at a state capitol); Jaffree, 472 
U.S. rrt 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984)(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The number of references, and prominence, 
given that Justice Stevens gives to Justice O'Connor's views on endorsement, albeit 
only in concurring opinions, seems more than a coincidence. 
123. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. rrt 2282. 
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had "an unconstitutional purpose."124 If the endorsement test 
has a purpose part, it is unclear whether its reliance on Lemon 
represents a redundancy or a substantive difference in mean-
ing between the purpose parts of the two tests. 
The endorsement test enunciated by Justice O'Connor 
sought to modify Lemon by creating a two-part test: 
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's 
standing in the political community. Government can run 
afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is exces-
sive entanglement with religious institutions, which may in-
terfere with the independence of the institutions, give the in-
stitutions access to government or governmental powers not 
fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the 
creation of political constituencies defined along religious 
lines. The second and more direct infringement is government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members 
of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite 
125 
message. 
In further explaining her stance on the governmental en-
dorsement of religion, Justice O'Connor called for modifications 
to both the purpose and effect tests in Lemon: 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether govern-
ment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. 
The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's 
actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a 
message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative an-
swer to either question should render the challenged practice 
invalid. 126 
Justice O'Connor subsequently added th;::.t, in measuring 
perception, the relevant issue is "how it would be perceived by 
an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative his-
tory, and implementation of the [government action]."127 Justice 
O'Connor has also attempted to provide definition to purpose 
124. !d. 
125. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88. (internal citations omitted). 
126. !d. at 690. 
127. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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under the endorsement test. For example, in Wallace u. 
Jaffree, 128 she pointed out that what is required is that "the leg-
islature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian en-
dorsements from its laws."12 Adding that a review oflegislative 
purpose requires "a deferential and limited"1:Jo inquiry, she 
noted that "our courts are capable of distinguishing a sham 
secular purpose from a sincere one."131 Further, she cautioned 
that courts have "no license to psychoanalyze the legislators ... 
[or to] denigrate an expressed secular purpose due to pos-
tenactment testimony by particular legislators or by interested 
persons who witnessed the drafting of the statute."132 Relyin£ 
on a statute's "history, language, and administration,"1 
O'Connor observed "there can be little doubt that the purpose 
and likely effect of this [moment of silence] enactment is to en-
dorse and sponsor voluntary prayer in the public schools."134 
Another uncertainty is whether the use of the purpose 
prong of the endorsement test would have produced the same 
result in Santa Fe as Lemon's purpose test did. Even so, it is 
worth acknowledging that in Wallace, Justice O'Connor sug-
gested caution in finding a nonsecular purpose under the en-
dorsement test while also cautioning that her concern can ap-
ply in a case not involving a facial challenge to a moment of 
silence statute. Using Lemon's purpose prong to mount a facial 
challenge to the policy in Santa Fe may have far-reaching im-
plications for student choice and Establishment Clause litiga-
tion. As Chief Justice Rehn~uist declared, the Court "applie[d] 
Lemon's factors stringently" 3fi in determining not only whether 
the school district's policy would inevitably violate the Estab-
lishment Clause even though it was never put into effect, but 
128. 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
129. Id. at 68. In invalidating the moment of silence statute, the Court noted that 
the state legislature had created a nonsecular purpose by the addition of the words "or 
voluntary prayer." 
130. !d. at 75. 
131. !d. 
132. !d. 
133. !d. Part of the past history of the moment of silence statute involved prior 
statutes that had permitted teachers to lead students in group prayers. The moment of 
silence statute, by adding "or voluntary prayer" was perceived as an attempt to express 
prayer as a state-favored manner of using the silence. 
134. !d. at 67. 
135. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2284 (2000) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
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whether it may be applied in violation of the Establishment 
Clause. 
Justice Stevens's position in Santa Fe suggests that, even 
in the absence of direct action by school officials, courts are free 
to make their own "worst-case" assumptions about what might 
occur, with the potential for chilling effects. 136 Thus, in present-
ing a facial challenge to a school district policy, this position 
holds that student choice will result in three cascading deci-
sions: a majority vote to have a pregame invocation/message; a 
vote to select a person who is likely to present a religious mes-
sage; and, a pregame message that is, in fact, religious. If, as 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent suggested, the majority relied 
on the Lemon purpose test because the purpose part of the en-
dorsement test has never been used in a facial challenge to a 
government action, 137 it is interesting to consider whether one 
can reasonably assume that the endorsement purpose test will 
take on the same strict definition as Lemon and be used in fu-
ture facial challenges. As noted, Chief Justice Rehnquist feared 
that while this was so, this convergence of definition may 
eliminate the endorsement test altogether. 
In light of Justice Thomas's neutrality test in Helms and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Santa Fe, which addressed 
endorsement as "the most rigid version of the oft-criticized test 
of Lemon u. Kurtzman,"138 the status of Justice O'Connor's test 
is unclear. That is, given Lemon's resiliency and the Court's in-
ability, or unwillingness, to adopt the endorsement test, future 
litigation may focus on whether there is need for a separate 
endorsement test or if meaning must be drawn from Lemon. If 
anything, Lemon's resiliency was evident in Helms, wherein 
Justice Thomas's plurality opinion enunciated a neutrality test 
that retained Lemon's purpose and effects prongs while relegat-
136. For a similar line of judicial decision-making, Justice Brennan's majority 
opinion in Aguilar u. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), struck down New York City's practice 
of delivering Title I services on site in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools even 
though there were no allegations of impropriety based on his fear that such a relation-
ship might have created excessive entanglement between the schools and the govern-
ment. 
137. Ironically, in Board of Education of Westside Community Schools u. Mergens, 
496 U.S. 226 (1990), the first school-related case involving the Establishment Clause 
wherein Justice O'Connor authored the opinion of the Court, she relied on Lemon 
rather than the endorsement. In any event, Mergens did not involve a facial challenge 
to the Equal Access Act since the litigation involved a school district's refusal to recog-
nize a request for a religious club under the Act. 
138. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2284. 
231] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 265 
ing excessive entanglement as one of three factors to be consid-
ered in determining effect. The other two factors under Tho-
mas's revised effects test are whether an action results in gov-
ernmental indoctrination and whether it defines its recipients 
by reference to religion. 
Justice Thomas's neutrality test, distilled from a combina-
tion of Establishment Clause cases involving various forms of 
t "d139 d f h 1 . 140 t . 1 governmen ai an ree speec c mms, presen s a s1mp e 
measure. Under this test, government aid that benefits reli-
gious schools is constitutional as long as it is neutral and re-
sults from private choice. The benefit of this test to religious 
schools is obvious: private choice is an intrinsic feature of all 
religious schools since a student's presence can be accounted 
for only by a parent and/or student choice to attend. The down 
side is, as discussed below, the apparent relative ease with 
which a challenge can be mounted against the constitutionality 
of aid. 
Neutrality, which may provide religious schools access to 
resources that are available to public school students, gives re-
ligious institutions broad access to a wide range of instruc-
tional equipment and materials. The only monitoring necessary 
for public school officials is to evaluate whether print and vis-
ual materials such as videotapes have religious content. Under 
the neutrality test, concerns as to how a religious school 
chooses to use its Chapter 2 equipment or materials are no 
longer relevant. However, Justice Thomas's plurality opinion 
appears to lack the votes to change the Establishment Clause 
test across the board. Thus, the courts remain in limbo, lacking 
a clear standard because Justice O'Connor's concurrence re-
tains some elements of the older Establishment Clause analy-
sis. Religious schools might become ineligible for benefits under 
per-capita aid programs such as Chapter 2, which is based on 
student enrollments, as opposed to private-choice programs, 
represented by individual applications for benefits in such 
139. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Ser-
vices for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (reh'g denied, Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. 
for the Blind, 4 75 U.S. 1091 (1986)); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 
(1993); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
140. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 
(1993) (prohibiting viewpoint discrimination in permitting a religious group to usc of 
public school facilities) Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) 
(prohibiting viewpoint discrimination in requiring a university to fund a student publi-
cation with religious content). 
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cases as Zobrest and Witters. Justice O'Connor would find gov-
ernment assistance constitutionally suspect if benefits were not 
supplemental to resources already available in religious 
schools, if the aid supplanted funds available to the school from 
nonfederal sources, and/or if there was evidence that the assis-
tance had been, or was being, diverted to religious uses. 
For many religious schools, Justice O'Connor's endorsement 
test, at least in its present version in Helms, would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to meet. For example, limiting the use of a 
VCR and monitor, purchased through Chapter 2, to play only 
nonreligious tapes may be neither feasible nor practicable. 
Similarly, restricting an overhead projector to use only for in-
struction in nonreligious subjects may be all but impossible in 
a pervasively religious school that integrates the Bible into all 
instruction. Even though Justice O'Connor placed the burden 
of proof on the one challenging the diversion of government 
funds, the relative ease by which this burden can be met 
through discovery is evident in Helms. 141 
One can argue that Justice O'Connor's distinction between 
private-choice and per-capita programs is no longer viable after 
Agostini, wherein her majority opinion upheld the use of pub-
licly-paid teachers on-site in religious schools to provide Title I 
remedial instruction in reading and mathematics for students 
in a low-income area, even though the children, who were se-
lected to receive the assistance, were individually identified by 
their teachers and never made application for the help. By pro-
viding publicly funded services to large numbers of students 
who were eligible without personally requesting help, and 
where all but fifty-eight of the 22,000 eligible students in New 
York City who attended nonpublic schools attended ones that 
were religiously affiliated, 142 Agostini arguably represented a 
break from Zobrest and Witters, wherein the recipients of aid 
sought it out. In Zobrest, the student received the services of a 
sign language interpreter due to the active participation of his 
parents in the educational process, while in Witters, the blind 
student was initially able to participate in the program at issue 
because he had to make an individual application for assis-
141. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct 2530 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (highlighting 
documentation demonstrating that Title I equipment was used in the classrooms for 
religious indoctrination and that a computer purchased with Title I funds was used to 
back-up a school's master computer when it failed). 
142. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 252 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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tance. It is unclear how far this analysis can go since Justice 
Souter's dissent in Agostini reads very much the same as Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion's concerns in Helms: 
[S]tudents eligible for such [remedial] programs may not ap-
ply directly for Title I funds. The aid, accordingly, is not even 
formally aid to the individual students (and even formally in-
dividual aid must be seen as aid to a school system when so 
many individuals receive it that it becomes a feature of the 
143 
system). 
At least for the present, the distinction between assistance 
to individual students in religious schools, even if a large num-
ber of students as in Agostini, and resources to a religious 
school for use with all children, as in Helms, represents an im-
portant dividing line. While States may choose to follow the 
Helms plurality and provide assistance to religious schools, 
they would be well advised to not ignore Justice O'Connor's 
concerns. 
Their limitations aside, the plurality and concurring opin-
ions in Helms offer a ray of hope to parents who lack resources 
to send their children to religious schools. Subject to any 
changes on the High Court Bench, it appears that a majority 
exists to uphold a voucher plan under the Establishment 
Clause, as long as the program provides benefits to students in 
both public and nonpublic schools. Presumably, as long as 
voucher funds could be used to attend public or nonpublic 
schools, the plurality's evenhandedness test is likely to be sat-
isfied. Likewise, a voucher program dependent on individual 
applications should allay Justice O'Connor's concerns about 
per-capita programs. Whether most parents choose to use 
voucher funds to send their children to religious schools rather 
than other public schools or nonsectarian nonpublic schools, 
seems to be irrelevant as Ion~ as the opportunity exists for par-
ents to make those decisions. 44 
143. !d. 
144. The Court does not seem influenced by the percentage of sectarian religiously 
affiliated non public schools or percentage of students in them who are affected by gov-
ernment assistance, in comparison to nonsectarian non public schools. See Agostini, 521 
U.S. at 251 (Souter, J., dissenting), upholding the on-site delivery of aid to students in 
nonpublic schools even though all but 52 of the 22,000 students who received Title I aid 
attended schools that were religiously affiliated. See also Jackson v. Benson, 578 
N.W.2d 602 (Wis 1998), motion for reconsideration withdrawn, 588 N.W.2d 635 (Wis. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998) where even though the aid was available for 
students in only nonpublic schools, the court reasoned that it was constitutional under 
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As the Court and the Nation debate the future of public 
education in light of various reform initiatives such as vouch-
ers, 
145 
and the reinvigorated Child Benefit test, educational 
leaders and policy makers face an important question. This in-
quiry asks whether future deliberations on state aid will focus 
on the broader question of where students can best be edu-
cated, thereby perhaps necessitating the adoption of Justice 
Thomas's neutrality test, or the narrower question of worrying 
about which forms of aid to students in religiously-affiliated 
nonpublic schools are acceptable based on the fear of avoiding 
endorsement or the ability to divert aid to religious purposes, 
which might favor the adoption of Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test. The way in which this question is resolved will cer-
tainly go a long way toward shaping the future of American K-
12 education. Yet, questions linger over the direction that the 
Court might take as the future of several members is uncer-
tain. 
C. The Court's Future 
As the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence continues to 
evolve, or devolve, and given the delicate balance that exists 
between and among its various factions, with one vote often 
making the difference, perhaps the most significant factor that 
will influence its direction will be the presidential election of 
November 2000. Insofar as several Justices are likely to retire 
over the next few years due to age and potential health prob-
lems, President George W. Bush will have the opportunity to 
shape the Court's future well into the next century based on his 
own philosophy. The change will be all the more interesting if 
the retirements include Chief Justice Rehnquist. Keeping in 
mind that, to date, there have only been sixteen Chief Justices 
but more than forty different Presidents, it should be clear the 
extent to which a presidential legacy can be shaped by judicial 
appointments. 
Even while acknowledging that there is no way of knowing 
for certain how future Justices might rule, 146 with Republican 
the Establishment Clause and similar provisions in the state constitution because chil-
dren attended these schools and were thus eligible to participate in the program based 
on the private choices of their parents. 
145. See supra, note 83. 
146. As an example of how Supreme Court .Justices have minds of their own that 
often surprise the Presidents who appoint them, the remarks of President Dwight D. 
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G~orge W. Bush of Texas as President, he is expected to ap-
pomt strict constructionist Justices who may be open to ac-
commodation. On the other hand, had Vice-President AI Gore, 
the Democratic standard-bearer, won the election, he would 
have been likely to name judicial activists and others who 
would have interpreted the Constitution based on their own 
ideological perspectives and would have been apt to favor sepa-
ration of Church and State.147 One thing is for sure, that if 
President Bush appoints the kind of Justices expected of him, 
and avoids his father's pitfall of appointing the likes of liberal 
Justice David Souter, and if these new Justices hold true to 
form, then the Court will move in a different direction, both 
with regard to prayer and state aid to students who attend re-
ligiously-affiliated nonpublic schools. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The place of religion in public education, in all of its mani-
festations, most notably as discussed in terms of prayer in 
school and governmental aid to religiously affiliated nonpublic 
schools, continues to occupy a central role in the Supreme 
Court's evolving First Amendment jurisprudence. At this, the 
dawn of the new Millennium, the Justices need to walk a fine 
line between providing too much aid to religion and religious 
institutions while avoiding hostility to religion. The way in 
which the Court resolves these thorny issues will go a long way 
in shaping both the quality of education that American chil-
dren receive, regardless of where they attend classes and, just 
as importantly, in determining what the face of the Nation will 
look like. 
Eisenhower come to mind. In light of the Warren Court's role in revolutionizing the 
face of American constitutional law and society, "Eisenhower later called his appoint-
ment of [Earll Warren 'the biggest damn-fooled mistake' he had ever made." DAVID M. 
O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 81 (1986). 
147. The attitudes of Governor George W. Bush of Texas and Vice-President AI 
Gore, the Democratic standard-bearer, were plainly evident in their first Presidential 
debate. See, e.g., " ... Mr. Bush did say that he wanted Supreme Court justices who 
'look at the Constitution as sacred' and that he believed in 'strict constructionists."' Al-
ison Mitchell, Bush and Gore Clash Over Tax Cuts in First Debate: Candidates Cite 
Differences on Priorities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at AI, 16. See also Stuart Taylor Jr., 
The Supreme Question, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 30 (discussing how possible ap-
pointees of Gore or Bush might influence the direction of the Court). 
